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IRIS
TJOA

the making of Soekarno

revisiting the Dutch narrative on a post-colonial scapegoat

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, student number 2714100
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set in stone.

Placed on the corner of the neighborhood where I have happily lived for the past few years, the bronze simper of Nelson Mandela reassures me daily to exercise my beliefs as I pass its 3,5 meters high tribute on my way to work. The statue was named *long walk to freedom* as an attempt by the Nelson Mandela foundation to raise awareness for Mandela's peaceful convictions. (Stroom Den Haag, 2012) A beacon of hope and prosperity. A hero of divine magnitude. In the wake of his posture tens of footsteps of children are printed into the nature stone pavement, to symbolise his path towards liberation.

aiming for.

While I applaud Mandela's praise, further inquiry into all sorts of colonial residue embedded in Dutch sepulture conducted me to question the nature of idolatry and the exclusivity that produces it. Statues utter a specific admiration of a 'historical fact but [do] not claim factuality as such.' (Balkenhol, 2020) This is in fair contradiction to monuments, where the expression of honor is not necessarily poured into the infatuation over a 'person or an event'. The 'putting someone on a pedestal' is quite literally an indication of worship and overrules historical correctness in order 'to make the past come alive and to establish an embodied relation with the audience'. (Balkenhol, 2020; Stengs, 2020)

> "Speaking to statues or paintings, kissing or beating them, claiming that works of art in their turn look at the viewer, talk or listen to them, move, sweat or bleed; or feeling love, desire, or hatred for images: all these reactions to works of art are part of a large complex of viewers' responses in which artworks are treated not as the inanimate objects they really are, but as living beings, whose presence is felt to be genuinely akin to that of a living being." (Van Eck, 2010, p. 3)

In this way, statues can be interpreted as objects that evoke, provoke and invoke a certain anthropomorphising 'power' that appeals to the emotional and 'influence human practice'. To commemorate through statue is to express an idolatry for that person or event. (Balkenhol, 2020) This immediately responds to the hermeneutical dilemma of idolatry - and touches the predicament of agency. Who has the power to define what memories we keep and how we keep memorising them?

On behalf of my very own Indonesian heritage - I wonder about the absence of Indonesian stoned perpetuation. If commemoration is related to idolatry, may we assume that lack of memorial correlates to a lack of idolatry? In Dutch historical reception, very few Indonesian leaders have been acknowledged, let alone them be commemorated as heroes.

Indonesia and South Africa both count as nations whose religious trajectories have been characterised by colonial history. (James & Schrauwers, 2003) Despite the similarities in their pasts very few scholarship has been conducted into comparative studies contesting both Indonesian and South African colonial particularities. A noteworthy comparison was presented by James & Schrauwers (2003) whose deductions regrettably did not contribute to follow-up research. The article however, mentions remarkable attestation to further

explore the continuities and differences between the two contextual settings, and the urgency for such an analogy in light of post-colonial theory.

James & Schrauwers claim the peculiar intersection between religion and race to be the sum of parallels between both locations and use the idiom of 'apartheid of souls' to emphasise its 'continuities.' The 'pillarisation' [dutch: verzuiling] in The Netherlands, the apartheid in South Africa and the 'aliran' [english: streams] in Indonesia illustrate extraordinary common ground. They lay bare the manner in which white minorities originating from their imperialistic ancestors continue to influence and reproduce racialised governing bodies through nationalistic religiosity and hereby oppose the 'universalistic secular liberal regimes' of their coevals in Europe.

Although Dutch colonial rule did not directly influence segregation in South Africa, the research shows how the Volkskerk and Kuyperian related ideologies preceded its racist justification and despite non-deliberate intent fragmented citizenship of both colonised and colonising through ethnic categories, and how both religion and race played an inevitable role in the construct of a post-colonial narrative. Through governmental logic James & Schrauwers argue a shared Calvinist ethos, and reproduction of ideas of liberal modernity to underpin the post-colonial conception of ethical paternalism.

> "One might even suppose that it traveled a different route to arrive at more or less the same place." (James & Schrauwers, 2003, p. 76)

Indonesia and South Africa have known similar battles towards independence, and were steered into revolution by their political leaders. In South Africa it was Nelson Mandela whose articulated speeches gathered solidarity and in Indonesia Soekarno's 'freedom by unity' [dutch: vrijheid door eenheid] became the leitmotif for his nationalistic campaign. Both of the leaders opposed the racist regime whole-heartedly, fought the refusal of their fundamental rights and by doing so, were sent to prison. Both were unwilling to submit to their oppressors and were committed to sacrifice their lives for freedom. (Mathijssen, 2020) According to Justin Wejak, personal analogies related to speech between Mandela and Soekarno can also be drawn in terms of 'mannerism and charisma.' (Wejak, 2000)

The notion that Nelson Mandela is nationwide regarded as a heroic paragon is one most Dutch citizens would comply with. It is the affiliation with Mandela that has esteemed de Klerk with worldwide glorifying renown. (Parool, 2021) Mandela's legacy has contested the manner in which colonialism is reviewed and the atrocities of the apartheid are scrutinised. Mandela's inquisition for human rights equality has shaped and altered the lives of many, and costed the lives of many as well. In this regard he is among one of a close circle of political leaders that bestowed global change. On Dutch premises memorials

of similar examples such as Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Martin Luther King, are stationary reminders of values Dutch culture means to identify with.

Yet on the very same grounds, the memory of Soekarno is infused by hatred and ambivalence. The protagonist reception of Mandela on one hand, and the antagonist reception of Soekarno on the other present a stark contrast. Where Mandela is consistently portrayed as a warrior of the humane, Soekarno remains to be condemned as a terrorist and enemy of the Dutch state. (Mathijssen, 2020) This discursive dichotomy between Mandela and Soekarno as respectively a manifestation of idolatry and its counterpart has conducted me to question:

In what way reveals the condemnation of Soekarno a continuance of Dutch colonial conceptions on religion and race?

a few methods.

In recent academic discussions, the concept of methodology has provoked a clangorous debate over theoretical theory in the field of religion. The discipline has challenged the legitimacy of methods in terms of epistemology, semantics and philology. The fragmentary landscape and consequently complexity of the domain has led to an absence of an adequate methodological framework to support research conducted by academia. (Engler & Stausberg, 2021) In this inquiry, it is my intention to adhere to a methodological pluralist approach as the intricacies presented here require a variety of considerations.

Discourse is the articulated construct of an assembly of either the written, spoken or drawn (or any derivative) that has acquired certain meaning through its repetitive character. (Foucault, 2019) An important element in understanding discourse is through 'intertextuality' which relates to the manner in which a collection of correlating discourses, known a 'discursive formation', conduce meaning. As discourse creates 'the world as it understands it', power dwells deeply - not interpreted within the stacked or dominant fragmental levels of institution - but across extent: "power is everywhere, since discourse too, is everywhere." Dominance and hegemony however, structure the 'claim over absolute truth', whereas the 'truth' is rooted in the intersection between power and knowledge. (Rose, 2016)

Apart from constituting the legitimacy of knowledge, discourse simultaneously distinguishes between those who *can be spoken of* (objects) and those who *may speak* (subjects). (Foucault, 2019) Subsequently discourse systematically entitles a selection of subjects as 'bearers of knowledge' meanwhile depriving objects freedom to self-represent and fuelling the 'subjugation of certain social groups' by the establishment of exclusive rules that adjudicate 'topics, methods, and actors of speech'. (Rutten & Theewis, 2020)

By extension, *hermeneutics* offer a philosophical complexity imperative to the evaluation of discourse. (Gilhus, 2013) Interpretation of any text can only be achieved by completing 'the Hermeneutic arc.' (Ricoeur, 1973) , which consists of three respectively fases; 1) the first naivety, 2) the distanciation and 3) the second naivety. In between the three fases occurs the dialectic shift negotiating 'explanation' and 'understanding.' (Ricoeur, 1973) The shift from decontextualization towards recontextualisation means the text is no longer a lifeless entity but a vibrant discourse with relevance to the present. The meaning transcends the original intention of its author and reaches a novel and useful purpose in terms of interpretation. In this way distanciation is not

a matter of alienation or detachment, but an opportunity to contain semantic autonomy and subjection to the creativity of its readership. (Ricoeur, 1973)

Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutical anthropology arises from critique on Western Philosophy's exploration of the Descartian 'subject'. This exalted subject, also referred to as the *'Cartesian Cogito'* portrays a utopian mind, an image freed from prejudiced traditions and built on a foundation of stability. Cartesian rationalism aims for the highest good: complete self-sufficient autonomy to the point of essentialised universal doubt. To Ricoeur, Descartes' acclaimed necessity for neutrality is flawed. Self-proclaimed neutral positions are rarely truly 'neutral.' Ricoeur's ideology is considered an optimistic anthropology which accepts and acknowledges the human's subjectivity as a 'wounded cogito; and its own being as a 'vulnerable self' - limited and fallible. (Moyaert, 2014)

Discourse analysis examines discursive patterns and origins in relation to their contexts, attempts to untangle and reveal the implicit political power structures that linger intertwined in the layers below the surface of the public narrative, and endeavours to empower the interests of the marginalised. (Fairclough, 2001; Hjelm, 2013)

Post-colonial theory - or '*post-colonialism*' disputes the production of knowledge and 'deals with the effects of colonisation on cultures and societies'. (Ashcroft, 2017) In existential philosophy, Sartre (2001) defines the relations between the Self and Other in *'Being and Nothingness'* as the creation of 'self-awareness' and ideas of identity, encapsulation a post-Freudian analysis of the establishment of a Subjectivity. (Lacan, 1968) His theory presents the *other* as the resemblance of the Self - and its counterpart the Other (capitalised) called 'the grand-autre' by Lacan (1968) a 'transcendent or absolute pole of address, summoned each time that subject speaks to another subject'. (Boons-Grafé, 1992, p. 298) The process of othering shows an ambivalence, for it simultaneously degrades and acknowledges the presence of another subject. (Fanon, 2008)

> "othering is a process by which the empire can define itself against those it colonizes, excludes and marginalizes, the business of creating the enemy, in order that the empire may define itself by its geographical and racial others".
>
> (Spivak et al., 1994, p. 57)

The process of othering creates negative identities, the so-called *post-colonial subject* defined in Edward Said's *'Orientalism'*, often in binary opposition to the Western, normative one. It justifies exploitation, exclusion, and marginalisation and preserves the Western white heterosexual male identity as the ideal and

any deviation as *less ideal*. This deviation manifests in terms of race, gender, sexual orientation, age, marital status, disability, body-type, and religion. (Spivak, 2012; Said, 1985)

Drawing on intersectional theory, my purpose is to narrate and untangle the epistemological power construct that defines condemnation as a derivative of Dutch nationalism through post-colonial discourse analysis foremost and secondarily critical feminist' and queer logics, as my argument comprises the encounter between race and religion to be thoroughly gendered. However, as the scope of this exploration is fairly limited, the research will focus minimally on the latter. The aim within the amplitude of this disquisition does not wish to construe further rendering of the essentialised embodiment of a post-colonial subject, but rather attempts to underline the importance of relinquishing the epistemic violence of repetitive categorisation.

summed up.

In this paper, I first explain the 'aliran' in Indonesia as a derivative of Dutch pillarisation, that formed along racial and religious lines. The Ethical Policy meant the intensification of colonial conduct, and housed a Calvinist ethos. In this manner, Dutch Christian ideologies infiltrated and defined the colonial governing bodies - transferring conceptions of the Islamic other - in combination with liberal secularism.

I henceforth determine the Kuyperian patronage an act of paternalism, and explain its concept as a form of othering. Afterwards I will narrate the birth of Indonesian Nationalism and Soekarno's ideologies concerning nationalistic progress underpinning racial inclined notions on religiosity.

Afterwards I will illustrate the condemnation of Soekarno in relation to the events during Japanese occupation, the Independence War and its aftermath. Soekarno can be identified as a post-colonial personification of the rising East, and thereupon appealed to the agitation of the post-war Netherlands.

Lastly, I will clarify the concept of Dutchness as a political and historical construct in the discursive condemnation of Soekarno. Dutch colonial conceptions have defined public debate on Dutch identity in terms of race and religion and othered the post-colonial identity of Soekarno into its binary opposite. Dutchness is infused by post-moral denial and amnesia, thus the depreciation of Soekarno shows the Dutch' inability to come to terms with its own colonial past.

my position.

Being human, we always start in media res. (Moyaert, 2014) I attest that, drawing on Holmes' theory as a self-reflexive researcher, I "aim to achieve "empathetic neutrality, i.e. that [I] should strive to avoid obvious, conscious, or systematic bias and to be as neutral as possible in the collection, interpretation, and presentation of data... [while recognizing that] this aspiration can never be fully attained - all research will be influenced by [me] and there is no completely "neutral" or "objective" knowledge." (Holmes, 2020)

As a scholar of theology I am invested in conflictstudies in the field of religion and I am particularly involved in Indo-Dutch religious history and post-colonial studies. My ideologies have sprung from my own sex, mixed race and spiritual convictions. I am committed to actively contribute to a society that listens to repressed voices and strives for human rights equality. Decolonisation therefore, is a central theme in my writings and inquiries. I balance at the junction between design and social sciences and I consider myself an agnostic, pacifistic, and curious humanist.

ethically speaking.

In the following paragraphs I will explain the 'aliran' in Indonesia as a derivative of Dutch pillarisation, that formed along racial and religious lines. The Ethical Policy meant the intensification of colonial conduct, and housed a Calvinist ethos. In this manner, Dutch Christian ideologies infiltrated and defined the colonial governing bodies - transferring conceptions of the Islamic other - in combination with liberal secularism.

In the article of James & Schrauwers (2003) the assumption that the 'aliran' in Indonesia sprung from deliberate intent is disputed, and the consequences of the Ethical Policy as a stepping stone towards pillarisation among religious and racial sectarian lines further explained. The most prominent feature of the aliran is the conclusion that *bangsa* [english: race or nationality] defeats *agama* [english: religion] and therefore the verticality of religious pillars derived from its initial racial horizontality.

> "How, in other words, did a set of diverse colonial civil servants and missionaries confront the issue of 'race' and 'culture' when 'Native' was almost synonymous with 'Muslim', and 'Dutch' almost synonymous with 'Christian', notwithstanding the many Hollanders in the colony who were, at best, indifferent Christians, the wide diversity of Islamic devotion and practice, and this Natives who had become Christian or remained animist."
>
> (James & Schrauwers, 2003, p. 58)

A 'diverse ethnic landscape of regional nationalisms' in the archipelago fueled the appearance of 'comprising aliran', also explained as 'streams'. (James & Schrauwers, 2003) The streams were:

> "Not merely loose conglomerates of people with similar voting habits. Rather they are social, fraternal, recreational, and religions organizations within which kinship, economic, and ideological ties coalesce to press a community of people into the support of a single set of social values which are not just concerned with the proper exercise of political power but condition behavior in many different areas of life. To join a Moslem political party is to commit oneself to one or another of the variant interpretations of Islamic social doctrine."
>
> (Geertz, 1976, p. 163)

At the end of the nineteenth century exclamations in the Netherlands arguing the Dutch debt of Honour [dutch: Ereschuld] meant the beginning of the Ethical Policy [dutch: Ethische Politiek]. (Kuitenbrouwer, 1996) The basis of these claims expressed the concern for the welfare of the colonised population and addressed the inherited responsibility the Dutch were 'ethically' obliged to take after the bankruptcy of the United East Indies Company. (Takken, 2021)

This social dissatisfaction arose from the maltreatment and exploitation of the indigenous society as a consequence of the so-called cultural system [dutch: cultuurstelstel]; a corrupt colonial bureaucracy that was a remnant of former imperialistic times. Many government officials in the Indies were impressed by Multatuli's book 'Max Havelaar', which exposed the abuses of the overseas subjects in the assistant residence of Lebak. Interestingly, Multatuli did not question colonial rule, but pledged the responsibility of the colonial officials to protect the locals against exploitation by indigenous monarchs and colonial politicians. (Touwen, 2000)

The ethical direction arising in Dutch politics aimed at the *uplift* or *upbringing* of the Indonesian population. Ideas about this ethical vocation arrived from the principle program of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) in 1879 which advocated a policy of 'moral obligation' [dutch: zedelijke verplichting]. The *Ethical Policy* was officially announced in the Netherlands in 1901 in Queen Wilhelmina's throne-speech at the States General. (Touwen, 2000)

> "As a Christian Power, the Netherlands is obliged to better regulate the legal position of native Christians in the Indies Archipelago, to lend more firm support to the Christian mission, and to permeate the entire government policy with the realisation that the Netherlands has to fulfill a moral attitude towards the population of these regions."

> [dutch: "Als Christelijke Mogendheid is Nederland verplicht in den Indische Archipel de rechtspositie der inlandsche Christenen beter te regelen, aan de Christelijke zending op vaster voet steun te verleenen, en geheel het regeeringsbeleid te doordringen van het besef, dat Nederland tegenover de bevolking dezer gewesten een zedelijke roeping heeft te vervullen."]

> (Troonrede, 1901)

Prime minister Abraham Kuyper argued that it was within Dutch 'duty' to educate Indonesians morally in order to assure their future independent position in the world. Welfare policy would help accomplish the 'verheffingsideaal' [english: elevation ideal]. The Ethical Policy consisted of a series of policy measures in respect to the indigenous population that could be grouped under three headings: education, irrigation and repatriation. (Kuppens, 2018; Pattynama, 2015; Touwen, 2000)

According to Kuyper, the Dutch had a Christian guardianship over non-Christians. Being a fierce Calvinist, his foremost aim was to merge the Eastern Islamic culture with the culture and knowledge of the Christian West. This unity of East and West would be achieved by converting Indonesian citizens to Christianity. The 'Kerstening' [english: conversion to Christianity] of Islamic communities would be the sole possibility in order to guarantee successful integration, once the children of the colony would migrate back 'home'. The heretic Islam was perceived as an essential obstacle to progress. (Jung, 2010) The proselytization of Indonesian children began to overtake the highest ranks on the political agenda, resulting in rigorous Catholic and Protestant missions that continued in the following decades. (Derksen, 2016b; Van Der Jagt, 2017)

Christian congregations in the Indies had existed for hundreds of years, yet with the installment of the Ethical Policy, subsidies for pastoral care received an impulse all throughout the colony. Social circumstances, religious motives and political desires had previously created a field of strain that repeatedly enflamed into bloody wars such as the Padriwar (1821-1837) and the Atjehwar (1873-1904). Where friction between Christians and Muslims had up till then acquired all sorts of uproar, tensions rose to a maximum when more Catholic and Protestant missionaries started to arrive in the archipelago. (Aritonang & Steenbrink, 2008)

The generous fundings attracted thousands of Dutch citizens within the span of a few years, who were required to oversee the establishment and maintenance of Dutch Christian schools and hospitals. The missionaries were mainly recruited from the religious bourgeoisie who migrated, often proceeding the fewest preparation - to the Indies commonwealth. They were instructed to report regularly on the advances of the proselytisation in the midst of the complex religious climate they encountered. There existed a hierarchical task division in which the highest in rank were the male missionaries, who occupied preaching, managing and administrative positions. Unmarried women who applied as nurses, teachers or social workers were ought to exert their Christian care, and the congregational work was performed by a rapidly increasing number of Indonesian personnel. (Derksen, 2016a)

The main opponents of the Christian conservatives were 'progressive' liberal and secular forces in both the Netherlands and the Indies who perceived no benefit in the spiritual motivation of their political competitors and pursued a religiously 'neutral' course in which no official position was taken regarding the desirability of Islam within the solicited emancipation of the Indies. However, all sorts of ideas about the incompatibility of Islam and modernity as a sociological notion were projected into colonial policy at the time. (Jung, 2010) In "*From Orientalism to neo-Orientalism: Early and contemporary constructions of Islam and the Muslim world,*" Salim Kerboua (2016) writes about the relation between Islam and the conceptions of the Other.

> "Neo-Orientalism is the prism through which some intellectual circles produce and disseminate new distorted knowledge about Islam and the Muslim world... The conceptual shifts of Orientalism show that interest- and identity-based representations of the Other have always been part of the Western historical dynamics in its relations with the peoples of the Muslim world..."

> (Kerboua, 2016, p. 27)

This Orientalist thinking towards Islamic representations thus defined the pillarisation in the Indies along racial and religious moieties. It is therefore within my argument the Calvinist ethos beheld Islamophobic assumptions, and conveyed their conceptions of the Islamic Other through the Ethical Policy from the early 1900's. Simultaneously ideas about modernity through liberal secularism promoted a neutrality in regards to religion as a whole but denied any construction of the Islamic Other as inferior to the Western Secular Self.

condem-nation.

In this chapter I determine the Kuyperian patronage an act of paternalism, and explain its concept as a form of othering. Afterwards I will narrate the birth of Indonesian Nationalism and Soekarno's ideologies concerning nationalistic progress underpinning racial inclined notions on religiosity.

An important propagandist of the Ethical Policy was journalist P. Brooshooft who published his ideas in an article in *De Locomotief*. (Touwen, 2000) Brooshooft reasoned as following:

> "Nor should we become sentimental, we should not rush to effect with 'the beautiful Insulinde', 'belt of emerald' or 'warm hearts for a good brown brother', who is certainly not better than the majority of human children — and that tells us little. What must compel us of our devotion towards the Indies is the best of human tendencies: the consciousness of justice, the feeling that we must, against his will, give the Javanese who has become dependent of us, the best we can give him, the generous urge of the stronger to treat the weaker fairly. Only when our colonial policy breathes in this atmosphere will we be good masters for the Indies."
>
> [dutch: "Ook moeten wij niet sentimenteel worden, niet op effect jagen met "het schoone Insulinde," "gordels van smaragd" of "warme harten voor een braven bruinen broeder", die zeker niet braver is dan het gros der menschenkinderen – en dat zegt weinig. Wat ons moet nopen tot plichtsbetrachting tegenover Indië is de beste der menselijke neigingen: het rechtsbewustzijn, het gevoel dat wij den, tegen zijn wil, van ons afhankelijk geworden Javaan het beste moeten geven wat wij voor hem hebben, de edelmoedige drang van den sterkere om den zwakkere rechtvaardig te behandelen. Eerst wanneer onze koloniale politiek ademt in dezen dampkring zullen wij voor Indië goede meesters zijn."]
>
> (Brooshooft, 1901)

As one can read in above passage, the ethical ideas that underpinned the policy were not oppugned as either paternalistic or patronising and were nationwide celebrated for their honorable intentions. The Ethical Policy, or Kuyperian *'patronage'* [dutch: bevoogding] as the term soon became commonly known as primarily facilitated the interests of the Dutch, but wore the pretense of charitable development aid. However, despite the abundance of

exclamations about the 'gratitude' the indigenous population putatively owed the Dutch for creating one colonial empire by unifying its islands - The Netherlands still was the highest profiter in terms of economical gain. The 'contribution' the Dutch delivered to Java and the Buitengewesten [english: outlying regions] consisted merely of administrative and technical 'expertise' instead of financial assets. The Ethical Policy therefore represented a model of rule in which categories of race and religion were fostered and legitimized through misconceptions of doing 'good'. Paternalism, in this way, is also a form of othering. This relates to the notion that a corrupt government can in fact recorrupt itself through governmentality, where power floods with the powerful, and is restrained from the powerless. In this manner, the 'bearers of the knowledge' continue to maintain agency over their own privileges without having to acknowledge or challenge them. (Foucault, 2019)

Despite the differing opinions among historians about the intentions of Ethical Policy, it can be concluded that its contents increased religious governmental intervention by the Dutch in the Indies. This strengthened the position of the Dutch government and the belief that the Netherlands liberated the indigenous population from corrupt and exploitative indigenous (and Islamic) authority. 'To pacify' remained a term frequently used when indicating the necessity to intervene, and to legitimate the urge for expansion. It implied the notion of the Dutch as peacemakers in a chaotic and violent region, and the misleading idea that The Netherlands improved its political and religious landscape to ensure a just existence for the entire Indonesian archipelago. The Ethical Policy therefore did not demarcate the end of the colonial era - but merely represented an intensification of colonial rule. (Gouda, 2008; Vickers, 2013)

Meanwhile political Indonesian formations began to question the governing legitimacy by the 'motherland', and various movements were founded that longed for the independence of the archipelago. The rise of the Indonesian Nationalist movement was a strain on the Dutch retina. There is an ironic note to mention here, as is can be attested that indirectly, the Dutch themselves facilitated the rise of Indonesian Nationalism. By improving the education in the Archipelago, enhancing the literacy among Indonesian citizens and stimulating critical thinking by projecting nationalistic ideologies - many indigenous inhabitants started to criticise their own contextual upbringings. The Indonesian Nationalism can be described as the 'awakening ambition' to break free from the cruel 'belanda's' [english: white skinned]. In that respect, the movement was perceived as the indigenous counterpart of the Ethical Policy and radicalised as the suppression by the Dutch grew stronger. (Touwen, 2000)

On June 6th, 1901, Soekarno was born in Soerabaja. His Javanese father belonged to the lower nobility and provided Dutch schooling for his son.

During his studies at the Technical University [dutch: Technische Hogeschool] Soekarno became acquainted with Omar Said Tjokroaminoto, chairman of Sarekat Islām, Indonesia's first significant political party. After graduating in 1926, Soekarno became increasingly active in the Nationalist movement, in the magazine *Indonesia Muda* he mentioned a synthesis between Nationalism, Islam and Marxism - which would fuel later Indonesian State Philosophy. (Melvin & Pohlman, 2018) Soekarno was not particularly impressed by the Western idea of democracy, which showed little compliance with Indonesian culture. He was more inclined toward the Javanese principles of *mufakat* [english: consensus] and *musyawarah* [english: discussion], which is based on the theory of constructive debate rather than confrontation and conflict. (Oltmans, 1995)

The persistent predicament that created division among Indonesian nationalists concentrated on the issue whether Islam, professed by the fair majority of the people, would substantiate the bind between the variety of societies present in the Indies or whether political movements toward independence should imply religious neutrality conducive to guarantee inclusivity among non-Muslim minorities in the archipelago. In the 1925 essay *'Nationalism, Islam and Marxism'* Soekarno attempted to cohere the three major religious pillars he witnessed in Indonesian society. In later letters Soekarno negotiated the place of Islam in the modern world as backwards and conservative. His judgment entailed Muslims lacked interest in the advances of technology and were inclined to cling to restrictive traditions that formed an obstruction in adapting to change and economical progress. (Kahin, 2012)

> "How much better it would be if the Islamic community remembered rather what is tolerated and neutral! How good it would be if they remembered that in worldly matters, in matters of statesmanship, "one may criticize (*berqias*), one may speak heresy (*berbidah*), one may abandon earlier customs, one may adopt new customs, one may have a radio, one may fly in an airplane, one may use electricity, one may be modern, one may be hyper-hyper modern" so long as this is not clearly forbidden or pronounced sinful by Allah and his Prophet."

> (Soekarno, 1959, p. 334)

Soekarno's ideas about Islam may have meticulously originated from his Western upbringing, and it interests me how his seemingly agnostic dogma portrayed a certain inferiority over Islam so early on in his political trajectory. The ideology centered around the meaning of modernity and hegemonic depiction of the West in terms of national improvement and advances in all sorts of societal realms - education, medicine and engineering - in which tradition comes to contradict the way forward, did not acquire any contestation nor critical Indonesian counter voices addressing this fact.

Despite being exceptionally antagonistic towards the representation of the White Dutch Saviour and anything that colonisation had fabricated, either constructively or destructively, did not allow Soekarno to put his own presuppositions concerning the Islamic Other under further review. In that regard, I would argue racial conceptions on a religious Other dwelled well within his Indonesian nationalist ideologies and I would attest with a firm belief that Soekarno depicted but a product of the same Western Enlightenment that he so ferociously battled to extricate. Soekarno came into being as a part of a racially segregated vehicle, fueled by the ideas and non-ideas of *a* religions, of *a* peoples, of *a* cultures. To unify and to become one nation would encompass one leader. What intrigues me, is that a logical representative of the Indonesian peoples would have been a spirit in line with the religiosity of those peoples it would pursuit to represent. 'One of the peoples' would therefore, have meant a *Muslim* leader.

In spite of this, in the second half of the 20's his leadership rose to a political summit, as his character exhibited brilliance, mental agility and above all - he proved an exceptionally gifted orator. He spoke out in favour of non-cooperation with the colonial government, in contrast to Nationalists who wanted to achieve independence through cooperation with the colonial government. (Wejak, 2000) Due to these developments, the Dutch East Indies government took an even more repressive attitude from the 30's onwards. An inevitable collision with Soekarno led to a lawsuit against him for having founded the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* [english: National Party Indonesia], an anti-capitalist independence party whereafter he was convicted in 1930 and served a two-year prison term. After his release, his popularity soared to unprecedented heights. Soekarno was convicted again in 1934 for publishing *Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka* [english: to Attain Independent Indonesia] - a booklet in which he passionately advocated the freedom of Indonesia. The nationalist leader was exiled to Ende, on the remote island of Flores after which he moved to West Sumatra in 1938. During his journey, masses of people gathered in train stations on their knees to pay him their respect. (Adams, 1965) To them, Soekarno resembled the embodied personification of their freedom.

state frenemy.

Below I will illustrate the condemnation of Soekarno in relation to the events during Japanese occupation, the Independence War and its aftermath. Soekarno can be identified as a post-colonial personification of the rising East, and thereupon appealed to the agitation of the post-war Netherlands.

The NSB political party in the Dutch Indies expanded immensely from 1930 till 1940 due to Dutch nationalists who grew anxious of the independence movements rising from the Indonesian population. At the beginning of March 1942, the situation in the Dutch East Indies changed dramatically when Japanese soldiers wiped out the entire Dutch colonial administration. Around 150.000 soldiers and civilians from Dutch or Indo-Dutch descent were placed in concentration camps run by the Japanese [dutch: jappenkampen]. Their primary goal was to purify Indonesia from Western influence. (Stoltz, 2020)

Initially the Javanese population perceived Japan as a liberator who delivered them from a cruel oppressor. A genuine hope prevailed that Indonesia would finally advance as a nation of postcolonial modernity. Soekarno returned to Java on Japanese invitation, desperately convinced neither Japanese armforce nor military power would lead the country into salvation - but rather the strength of Japanese character, in which Soekarno foresaw an opportunity. For Indonesia to develop and to embed prosperity, it was imperative to recognise its own weakness - in that respect the colonial western poison that The Dutch had pumped into Indonesian veins needed to be cleansed. Japan demonstrated an exemplary Asian willpower to refuse succumbence to their imperial agressor and pledged Indonesia refrain from exploitation, unlike their former rulers. After centuries of oppression - Indonesia finally faced the possibility of being freed from the Netherlands. (Mark, 2018)

Indonesian independence would not see the light of day under Japanese rule as they unexpectedly capitulated on August 15th, 1945 - two days later Soekarno declared Indonesian Independency and hence commenced the beginning of his presidency. In the subsequent 5 years the Bersiap [english: Independence War] meant the occurrence of many violent conflicts in order to secure colonial liberation. The Dutch lost the war - and returned beaten and bitter homewards. The Netherlands formally recognized Indonesian sovereignty in 1949.

On the day of Japanese capitulation, Huib van Mook - the highest ranking governor and colonial Dutch administrator in the Indies - assured the Dutch elite the colony would be restored to former glory. He and other members of

Dutch descent had found refuge in Australia during Japanese occupation. Although no governmental officials were in fact acquainted with the situation on Javanese soil, according to several KNIL-soldiers rumor had it due to Soekarno's conspiracy with the Japanese his popularity among the Indonesian population had severely decreased. The document van Mook received two days later in which Soekarno declared the Republik Indonesia thus raised minimal consternation - a pariah's cry of despair. (Adams, 1965)

That laconic judgment faltered when more clarity became apparent and Dutch newspapers started printing facts about the chaotic events in Java. The tension rose to unaccustomed heights when word spread Indonesian 'terrorists' in Batavia were collecting weaponry, hanging red and white flags on buildings and writing slogans preaching Indonesian freedom. Images of emaciated Dutch women and children who had been interned during Japanese occupation in camps flooded the media.
(Adams, 1965)

In October 1945, reports of anarchy in Java and violent deaths in Surabaya followed. Supporters of Soekarno were said to have taken control over the hostage of 'European Women' in Bandung. Dutch editors indulged in excoriations - 'Jappenvazal' [english: Japanese vassal], 'Quisling', 'the Indische Mussert.' On December 4, De Volkskrant printed a photo of Soekarno, with the caption: "De brutale mond van Hitler, de kaak van Mussolini en de methodes van de Japanse krijgsheren." [english: "Hitler's brutal mouth, Mussolini's jaw and the methods of the Japanese warlords."] The hostile qualifications that were awarded Soekarno in the Dutch press typify the spirit of the summer of 1945. Soekarno was considered an immediate enemy of the Dutch colonial empire. (Mathijssen, 2020)

Nationalisme van Japanse makelij

Beter dan woorden geven deze twee plaatjes een beeld van het door de Jappen geïnfecteerde nationalisme van de extremisten in Indonesië.

Soekarno met de brutale mond van Hitler, de kaak van Mussolini en de methodes van de Japanse oorlogsheren spreekt een aantal jongeren toe, die in Djokjakarta bijeengekomen waren.

In the first post-war months the Netherlands was heavily under the spell of right and wrong. After German occupation, the Dutch national self-esteem had been shredded into pieces and the nation was mourning its losses. Groups that posed a threat to the commonwealth had to be distrusted and combated,

resulting in a hatred towards former NSB members and communists as a latent danger. Indonesian nationalists were seen as a threat to the maintenance of the colonial empire, and therefore also labeled as an enemy. Lawsuits were conducted against collaborators and traitors all over Europe hence the Dutch government refused to negotiate with Soekarno in the first months after the Japanese capitulation. (Romijn, 2020)

The image of Soekarno as a collaborator has resonated for decades, especially in historiography, where Soekarno appears in the storytelling through overwhelmingly white and male infused perspectives. (Hoek, 2019) The actions, thinking and motives of Soekarno throughout history remain significantly underexposed in the Dutch narrative. Any alternative view is cast aside by only one dominant version of history. Soekarno seems to have accumulated full blame for the violent atrocities during the Bersiap. (Hoek, 2019; Mark, 2018)

Historians such as Loe de Jong, who has undisputedly published one of the most important historical works on the Netherlands in the Second World War, describes Soekarno consistently through negative annotations. To criticism addressing this fact De Jong has replied "ik kan mij de luxe van twee normenstelsels niet veroorloven" [english: I cannot afford the luxury of two sets of standards]. (Mathijssen, 2020) Likewise, for the only Dutch biography written on Soekarno its writer Lambert Giebels has been questioned by experts in colonial history regarding his western framing (Blokker, 2001) The allegations towards Soekarno are amply discussed in letters between former soldiers and veterans where language bespeaking Soekarno often involves terms such as 'collaborator', 'terrorist' and 'murderer'.

about dutchness.

In this last passage I will tie the concept of Dutchness as a political and historical construct to the discursive condemnation of Soekarno. Dutch colonial conceptions have defined public debate on Dutch identity in terms of race and religion and othered the post-colonial identity of Soekarno into its binary opposite. The Dutch post-colonial discourse is infused by post-moral denial and amnesia.

For more than seventy years, the Netherlands has blocked research into its own colonial past. (Oostindie, 2011; Wekker, 2016) The Netherlands condemned the role of the US in the Vietnam War and the Apartheid in South Africa, yet an investigation comparable to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee in which both predators and victims confront their violent pasts has never been a priority on the political agenda. The Netherlands has left the abuses in the Indies virtually untouched in the history books. In this manner any self-engagement in regards to the colonial regime that degenerated into a reactionary quagmire of dictatorship that was - in no way inferior to the later abhorred policy of the apartheid in South Africa - remains to be absent. (Steinmetz, 2018)

The narrative on history in the Netherlands is tragically indoctrinated by postcolonial nostalgia and romanticising stories about an exalted Golden Age. During colonial times the bond between The Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies was considered a self-glorifying engagement at the high tide of the imperial crown - unifying the most 'easy-going' members of Europe to the most 'easy-going' members of Asia. This discourse is also expressed by the Indo-Dutch repatriates where the idealisation of the Tempo Doeloe is merely a cloaked worship of the colonial era. (De Mul, 2010; Pattynama, 2014; Wekker, 2016)

After World War II, reconstruction and rehabilitation in The Netherlands deprived the Indo- Dutch repatriates of epitomizing the colonial past and 'disappeared from the public eye' to become 'a well-kept family secret – a blind spot on the national retina.' (Pattynama, 2013) The memories of German occupation launched a dominant discourse of The Netherlands as a virtuous underdog, victimized by the reign of its neighbour country. The depiction of the Dutch as relentless imperialist was buried beneath the prevailing recollection of its deplorable sufferance during wartime. (Boehmer & Gouda, 2009; Pattynama, 2013)

Discourse on colonial legacies altered in the late 60's. Stories that addressed racism, exploitation and war crimes in the 'Gordel van Smaragd' [english: Belt of Emerald] shattered the national pride over the imperial empire. Former veterans had previously mourned the loss of the colony, and found themselves all of a sudden obliged to confront the monstrosities of their overseas heirloom. Once a representation of accomplished Eastern trade - now shame and guilt over the actual dehumanising occurrences in the Indies stirred the repressed 'conscience of the nation'. Simultaneously hermetic quarrels on Dutch identity in public debate resulted in the apprehension of a Dutch national self. To be 'typically Dutch', or to portray true Dutchness became a prerequisite for acquiring Dutch citizenship and adaptation into Dutch 'culture'. (Van Reekum & Van den Berg, 2015)

Despite its history as an imperial aggressor, the public narrative on Dutchness started to suggest qualities such as progression, straightforwardness and open-mindedness whilst demonstrating exceptional hospitality and 'tolerance' towards minorities. The reception of the Dutch as a small yet exceedingly just, secular and anti-racist nation, operating from a moral high ground is an internalised dominant discourse and part of a 'cultural archive'. (Wekker, 2016) The tendency to resist the acknowledgment of the colonial past and the reluctance to narrate over the memories of violent conflicts - is an occurrence best referred to as 'post-moral denial'. The failure of recognition of the Dutch participation in colonisation and slavery - the so-called 'colonial amnesia' - shows the nation's present inability to come to terms with the past. (Wekker, 2016)

The repetitive discourse of Dutch exceptionalism can be understood through the disquisition of nationalism, where 'Nationality is a contingent and contested claim, not a social fact.' (Friedland, 2001) A pivotal trait mark embedded in Dutch exceptionalism is the peculiar concatenation of secularisation, deriving from the social order of fragmental moieties 'along confessional or sectarian lines in a segmented polity' named *pillarisation* [dutch: verzuiling]. Pillarisation structured religious and political convictions and ideologies among separate pillars and created distinction by default. Along the coequal verges of Dutch secularism lies the notion of homonationalism, a complex phenomenon ingrained with conundrums of gender and sexuality where The Netherlands depicts a beacon of 'women's liberation and sexual freedom.' Genealogically located as an immediate consequence of de-pillarisation, the secular has come to represent emancipation, whereas the religious its direct counterpart. Id est, to be religious is to express homophobia and to acquiesce male's oppression. (Bracke, 2011) It is in these disputes that a creation and emphasis on the

division between minor and major narratives has occurred. Dominant discourse declares harmonious 'coexistence of LGBTQ+ citizens and religious communities within Dutch society' a non plausible scenario as the concept of religion is interpreted to oppose sexual tolerance. (Bracke, 2011; Rutten & Theewis, 2020)

As several scholars have argued in recent literacy Dutchness is still characterised and infused by Christian cogitations where the divine has been substituted by the secular sacred. (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2020; van de Port, 2010) Islamophobia and representations of the Islamic Other remain to be abundantly visible in Dutch public debate . All sorts of ideas and religious residue continues to influence the presumed modern, liberal and secular foundation Dutch policy, legislative and governing administration is built upon. Thus Dutchness can be interpreted as primarily a political and historical construct rather than an accurate depiction of national identity, as Dutch colonial conceptions on race and religion have defined the public narrative for centuries on end. It is exactly these exertions of Dutch pillarised ideas that have conduced a structurally similar force field in the Indies that ultimately led to the making of nationalist resistance.

Thus I argue the Dutch did indirectly produce a derivative of their own liberal and secular views in human form, and condemned that form as its most dreadful antagonistic nemesis. Narrating the history as stated above preceding the condemnation of Soekarno demystifies in my opinion his rendering of an enemy of the Dutch state. Soekarno embodies a vessel of Eastern resistance, and still remains to trigger ambivalent and complex feelings over Dutch colonial history. The rise of the Other is a deeply ingrained societal moral panic that Soekarno personifies. A post-colonial scapegoat that appeals to the emotional and communal and where no writer on Dutch history has yet located the necessity to challenge that reception. Idolatry might be highly contextual, but the condemned find themselves reaching for the short end when it comes to retelling a discourse that is similarly biased and distorted.

wrapped up.

In this paper I have intended to untangle the antagonistic discourse that has centered around Soekarno in Dutch colonial history. I have attempted to respond to the following vital question:

In what way reveals the condemnation of Soekarno a continuance of Dutch colonial conceptions on religion and race?

In formulating an answer I have started by positioning the 'aliran' in Indonesia as a derivative of Dutch pillarisation, paving the groundwork for the Ethical Policy. Calvinist ideologies hence infiltrated and defined the colonial governing bodies - transferring paternalistic conceptions of the (Islamic) Eastern Other. As colonial policy strengthened, so did its counter voice - Indonesian Nationalism was born under Soekarno's command. Soekarno's ideologies concerning nationalistic advancement entailed racial inclined notions on religiosity. Japanese occupation dismantled Dutch colonial rule, who identified Soekarno as the embodiment of the rising East. In its aftermath, post-war public debate in the Netherlands constructed a political narrative on Dutch identity and othered the post-colonial identity of Soekarno into is binary opposite. In this manner, the condemnation of Soekarno shows the Dutch' inability to come to terms with its own colonial past.

As the scope of this inquisition is fairly limited, there remain plenty of questions to be answered. The absence of Indonesian voices in the public debate addressing the importance of a more critical analysis of Dutch colonial history leaves me disheartened and emphasises the pertinence for adequate representation and necessity for kaleidoscopical critiques doubting the 'common sense' when resorting to similar societal themes. The silence, is in my opinion, no attestation to irrelevance - as the lack of debate does not correspond automatically to a lack of controversy, and do neither indicate a peaceful coexistence among Dutch indigenous communities and diaspora. In the words of Bracke (2011):

> "'Talking back' is a complicated matter. It provides fruitful ground to explore how speech and subject formation, and indeed agency, relate. The subject who talks back to dominant discourse is ultimately a subject who has been interpellated by that discourse, and therefore whose being, at least to a certain extent, relies on or points back to that discourse."
>
> (Bracke, 2011, p. 43)

On the corner of the neighborhood where I have happily lived for the past few years, the bronze simper of Nelson Mandela reassured me daily to exercise my beliefs as I passed its 3,5 meters high tribute on my way to work.

Nowadays, his petrified presence on Dutch soil expresses an uneasy sense of mockery to me - the cast metal has slowly dissolved into a representation of that what is told, that what is foretold - and that what is untold. In the words of Remco Raben: "Kolonialisme gedijt alleen bij een dubbele moraal" [english: "Colonialism solely flourishes with double standards." (Raben, 2019)

food for thought.

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